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Abstract
The paper compares the policy choices regarding risk-transfer against
low-probability-high-loss events between elected and appointed pub-
lic o￿cials. Empirical evidence using data on U.S. municipality-level
shows that appointed city managers are more likely to adopt federal
risk-transfer regimes. It is argued that the variation in the level of
insurance activity emerges from the di￿erent incentive schemes each
government form is facing. Controlling for spatial dependencies fur-
ther shows that the participation decision in the insurance program
signi￿cantly depends on the decision of neighboring communities.
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11 Introduction
Climate change, terrorist attacks, natural hazards or industrial accidents are
risks that have two distinct features in common: A relatively low proba-
bility of occurrence and potentially large adverse e￿ects on society either
in terms of physical damage to human lives and capital stock or psycho-
logical e￿ects by creating fear and uncertainty even within the una￿ected
part of the population. Of course, protection against such events is possible
either by decreasing the probability of occurrence (e.g. reduction of green-
house gases, surveillance activity) or reducing the damage potential (e.g.
structural measures, catastrophe management) or transferring the risk (e.g.
insurance, governmental relief). From a politico-economic perspective a key
question is, which is - behind the veil of ignorance - the optimal societal
decision mechanism for the provision of protection against low-probability-
high-loss (LPHL)-events? The analysis in this paper emphasizes speci￿cally
on the analysis of LPHL-events in connection with natural hazards and the
relevant risk-transfer mechanisms.
In general the concept of the veil of ignorance, although a useful tool
for the theoretical analysis, is hard to transfer to the real political process
as the proposed uncertainty about future individual position in society is
nearly impossible to install, even at the constitutional table. Policies re-
garding climate change and its e￿ects on humans (e.g. change in probability
and magnitude of climatic natural hazards such as ￿oods) might present
a situation where uncertainty about the future individual position is more
distinct than in other situations. Both theoretical and empirical research
have shown that the market for risk-transfer against natural disasters tends
to work imperfectly or fail completely (Kunreuther & Pauly 2004). The
existence of transformation costs explains that sometimes information on
the insurance market is unevenly distributed between the contract partners.
This problem of asymmetric information is one of the basic explanations why
the insurance market in general does not work perfectly. The resulting phe-
nomena of adverse selection and moral hazard also applies to the market for
disaster insurance (Kunreuther 2001). Kunreuther & Pauly (2004) suggest
that market imperfections might be a combined problem of transaction costs
and ambiguity about probability estimations by di￿erent insurance compa-
nies. The search for the optimal insurance imposes costs which are high
2enough to discourage the individual to engage in any further mitigation ac-
tivity. Another strand of literature follows the ideas by Kahneman, Slovic &
Tversky (1982) who argue that individuals’ decisions in LPHL-situations are
subject to choice anomalies. The empirical work by Browne & Hoyt (2000)
￿nds that recent ￿ood experience increases the demand for ￿ood insurance
and thus gives some support to concepts of choice heuristics. Brookshire,
Thayer, Tschirhat & Schulze (1985) and Troy & Romm (2004) examine how
the disclosure of information on natural hazard risks in￿uences price gra-
dients in hedonic market analysis. Both studies show importance of the
distribution of information and that biases and imperfections on the mar-
ket could be an issue of transaction costs rather than heuristics. Although
the explanations for the failing of the market in the area of disaster insur-
ance are multiple there is a rather broad consensus that state intervention
could enhance e￿ciency and that ex-ante risk-transfer policies are prefer-
able to ex-post policies (Kunreuther & Pauly 2006). The decision regarding
risk-transfer policies is usually not subject to direct democratic action but
is either transfered to elected representatives or appointed agents such as
bureaucrats or council managers. Thus, the purpose of this paper is a pos-
itive analysis that compares the decisions of elected and appointed agents
regarding the implementation of an existing risk-transfers mechanism against
natural hazards.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section sets the
theoretical framework and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the
empirical application with data on communal decision on the participation in
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the USA. The last section
concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
We have to assume that biases from decision making under uncertainty ex-
plained by the standard expected-utility theorem (Kahneman et al. 1982)
also apply to political and bureaucratic decision makers. However, as a result
of the institutional context politicians and bureaucrats face di￿erent incen-
tive schemes. According to public choice theory (e.g. Downs 1957, Mueller
2003) politicians’ decisions are mainly driven by re-election concerns. This
3holds true especially within a highly competitive democratic system where
re-election constraints are binding and results in an ‘as if’ vote maximization.
The other decision mechanism of interest is bureaucracy. The hypotheses
of the standard theory on bureaucracy about budget-maximization (Niskanen
1971) or augmenting discretionary power (MiguØ & BØlanger 1974) do not
explicitly apply to our case. Agents in our context are not traditional bu-
reaucrats but appointed city managers. In contrast to re-elected executives
their appointment depends on the perceived talent and ability not primarily
by voters but by the reference group of peers. Potential future employ-
ees (e.g. municipalities) evaluate the performance of the city manager with
meaningful indicators. The major goal of this kind of bureaucrat is a high
market value within the community of other city managers which can be
obtained via ‘performance excellence’, i.e. by showing that the city man-
ager’s tasks are carefully executed. Thus there are analogies to the politico-
economic model on the behavior of the World Bank (Frey 1984, Frey &
Schneider 1986), ideas about central bank independency (Rogo￿ 1985) or
￿scal policies (Blinder 1997, Alesina & Tabellini 2007a).
Another explanation for varying policy outcomes can be found in the
agency literature. Maskin & Tirole (2004) suggest that the election pro-
cess allows the public to make politicians accountable for their actions. In
contrast to appointed o￿cials, politicians are more accountable due to this
institutional constraint. Thus they are more likely to accord (or response) to
voter’s opinion, even if it is short-sighted as in the context of natural hazard
insurance.
This relative higher level of independence from voters or interest groups
allows appointed executives to implement policies that that realize bene￿ts
only in future o￿ce-terms. The empirical study by Rauch (1995) that the
civil service reforms and the accompanied formalization of city governance in-
creased investment in long-term public infrastructure projects in U.S. cities.
Based on the ￿ndings in the literature we develop a simple model of
the decision context regarding choices for risk-transfer mechanisms against
natural hazards (see Appendix). The basic intention of the model is not
to augment existing decision models and apply them to political agents.
In contrast we assume, that the political decision makers follow the same
decision models as other individuals do. Thus, decision outcomes do not vary
because political executives are ‘immune’ against choice anomalies or have
4advantages in processing information. Rather, they might derive other policy
choices because of the incentive scheme set by the institutional framework
within they act.
The main conclusion of the theoretical model is that politicians and bu-
reaucrats face di￿erent performance measures. While the politicians care
about their re-election probability short-sighted preferences by the voters
are directly transfered to the politicians’ utility function. In contrast bu-
reaucrats’ performance is not only measured by the population’s utility but
also more objective and comparable performance measures, such as income
or budget result. As long as there is some probability that a loss occurs
and the fraction of the comparable indicator in the whole performance mea-
surement is >0 the bureaucrat always has an incentive to invest at least
some of the budget in risk-transfer. In addition the results of the model sug-
gest that the probability of participation increases in income and occurrence
probability.
3 Empirical Application
We test our hypotheses on adoption decisions of the U.S. National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) on community level. In response to the rising
burden of tax-payer funded disaster relief the U.S. congress initiated an in-
stitutionalized public-private-program for ￿ood insurance called the NFIP in
1968. The central idea of the program is to counteract ‘charity hazard’ the
phenomenon that individuals tend to underinsure or do not insure at all due
to anticipated federal aid or private charity. Until 1973 the municipality’s
participation in the program was entirely voluntary. However, in order to
increase incentives to participate the U.S. congress passed the Flood Disaster
Protection Act in 1973, which demands the mandatory purchase of ￿ood in-
surance for properties in ￿ood prone areas, where the owner seeks mortgage
from a federal lending institution. The program o￿ers subsidized premiums
(on average 30%-40% of the actual risk premium) for buildings constructed
before the community joined the NFIP and actuarily fair premiums for all
other private buildings in exchange for the adpotion and enforcement of
municipal ￿oodplain management systems (Federal Disaster Management
Agency 2002).
5U.S. communities show a variety of forms of city governance such as
elected-mayor councils, council managers (city managers), commissions or
representative town meetings. For the purpose of this study we consider
only the mayor council (elected chief executive) and the council manager
(appointed chief executive). The council manager resulted from a govern-
ment reform in the early 1900s (the ￿rst city manager came into position
in 1908) as a response to corruption an ine￿ciencies in major eastern cities
(Kreft 2007). City managers are appointed by an elected city council and
have full responsibility over ‘managerial tasks’, e.g. day-to-day operations,
employment issues of the government’s sta￿, budget preparation and rec-
ommending policies. This form should ensure that public policies promote
long-term e￿ciency in the provision of public goods and sustainable devel-
opment of the community, rather than following partisan interests and/or
ine￿cient, ‘short-sighted’ political pressure. According to Kreft (2007) there
is a current trend of adopting the council manager form of government in
U.S. cities.
3.1 Data
Data on a municipalities entry into the regular NFIP, the initial date the
Flood Hazard Boundary Map went into e￿ect and other information on
the NFIP stems from the Community Status Book (2006) published by the
FEMA. The data on the form of government comes from the 1987 Census
of Governments, Government Organization File by the U.S. Census. More
recent data on the form of community government is available from the 1997
and 2002 Municipal Form of Government survey conducted by the Interna-
tional City/County Management Association (IMCA). However, Enikopolov
(2007) and Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi (2005) suggest that the 1997 sample is
biased toward large communities (< 2,500 inhabitants) and that the respon-
dent and non-respondent communities in the 2002 sample di￿er in ethnic
division, population and income. Therefore the analysis in this paper only
constructs a cross-section sample using data from the 1987 survey. Data
on the communities budget stems from the 1987 Census of Governments,
Government Finance File. Since this ￿le only contains each single budget
position, total general revenue, total current expenditure and the budget
surplus are to be calculated manually using the Guidelines for Calculating
Totals and Subtotals from the Government Finance Public use File. Data on
6economic, other socio-demographic as well as geographic characteristics of
the communities is obtained from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing
for the year 1990.
To our knowledge there is no comprehensive and consistently collected
data on ￿ood events or ￿ood exposure on community-level publicly available.
The most disaggregated and comprehensive data on ￿ood hazards and prop-
erty damage and historical ￿ood events can be found in the Sheldus database
provided by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute, University of
South Carolina. This data, however, is only available at county-level. This
database includes all ￿ood events between 1969 and 2006 resulting in more
than U$ 50,000 in property or crop damage. The di￿erent datasets are
merged using FIPS codes for states, counties and places as well as commu-
nity names.
The data from the 1987 Census of Governments ￿les contains informa-
tion on 38,932 municipalities. Datasets were merged using information on
the community name and State FIPS. Only observations with a unique iden-
ti￿cation were kept in the dataset. In the ￿nal step data on the community’s
status within the NFIP was merged. This information was obtained from
the FEMA’s NFIP Community Status Book (Federal Disaster Management
Agency 2007). The ￿nal dataset thus only contains municipalities that have
been collected in the status book which ensures that the municipality faces
at least some ￿ood risk at all. We further limit the dataset to municipali-
ties with more than 1,000 inhabitants in order to avoid probable biases and
irregularities with very small communities1. The geographical locations of
the 5,008 municipalities in the ￿nal sample are presented in ￿gure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
As we can see there is a concentration of sample communities at the
eastern part of the USA. This accumulation can be explained by the larger
population density and larger community size. Table 1 represents summary
statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the estimation
processes throughout the paper. The majority of control variables add to the
communities damage potential (e.g. mean family income, housing density,
rental units, population) and we thus expect a positive sign in the regres-
sion analysis. The ￿gures in table 2 indicate no strong correlation between
1Estimates with the sample before this reduction, however, leads to similar results.
7these additional control variables and mean family income. The annual bud-
get result is also expected to have a positive impact on the participation
probability as a surplus might facilitate the installation of the requested
￿oodplain management ordinances. We expect the signs for unemployment
and the number of poor persons to be negatively related with the dependent
variable.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
3.2 Empirical strategy
Our empirical analysis consists of four stages: First, we examine the validity
of our model’s key assumption. Then we test our major hypothesis about
the in￿uence of the communal government form on risk-transfer decisions.
After that we perform a robustness test and examine the spatial properties
of our econometric model.
Before estimating the e￿ects of di￿erent governmental forms on the deci-
sion to participate in the NFIP, we test the plausibility of one of our assump-
tions. Based on the theoretical model appointed o￿cials are considered to
make decisions about a publicly provided good or risk-transfer with regard to
an objective performance parameter, in our case income. Therefore we test
whether municipalities governed by an appointed o￿cials signi￿cantly report
higher levels of mean income. The following OLS-model will be applied
ln(Mean Family Income) = δ0 + δ1GovFormi + δ2Zi + ηi (1)
where GovFormi is a dummy that switches to 1 if community i is ruled
by an appointed o￿cial and communities with an elected o￿cial are the ref-
erence group. Zi is a vector of explanatory variables describing community i
and etai is the error term. A municipality’s governmental form could be the
subject of endogeneity. One might assume that only wealthier communities
adopt the decision rule of appointed executives. In order to overcome po-
tential endogeneity issues we instrument the the governmental form dummy
using the level of current expenditure, the fraction of municipalities ruled by
8city managers within the county and the year a municipality adopted local
self-government.
After our assumptions have been tested regarding their validity we turn
our focus towards the key question of this paper. As the decision whether to
participate in the NFIP or not is a clear discrete choice situation we employ
a maximum likelihood estimator. Based on the hypotheses in section 2 the
following econometric equation is speci￿ed:
yi = β0 + β1GovFormi + β3Xi + β4
N X
c=1
Floodsc + ηk + i (2)
As we only have cross-section information on the form of government as
well as a number of municipality characteristics in the years 1987 or 1990 we
de￿ne our dependent variable as
yi =
(
yi = 1 if EntryY ear ≤ 1987
yi = 0 otherwise
GovFormi is a dummy that describes municipality’s i form of govern-
ment, Xi is a vector of control variables,
P
Floodsc is the amount of ￿ood
days within the county (the proxy for the municipality’s ￿ood exposure), ηk
are state speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects2 and i is the error term.
Once a community participates at the NFIP it is obliged to maintain
active ￿oodplain management. This should reduce the ￿ood risk or at least
the magnitude of ￿oods occurring. Using the sum of ￿ood days as a proxy
for local ￿ood risk - although valuable with respect to the individual risk
perception - could give rise to another endogeneity issue. We therefore per-
form an additional probit-estimation using an alternative measure for the
municipality’s ￿ood risk. Exogenous variables on the natural process (e.g.
precipation data) are available for some regions of the U.S., however, de-
scribing the hydrological process of a ￿ood has severe short-comings as one
cannot analyse the relationship between the climatic and the topographic
processes. An alternative would be data on the local ‘objective’ ￿ood risk
such as information about the housing distribution within the ￿ood-hazard-
zones. Unfortunately such data is not available to the public. Therefore we
used GIS-data on ￿ood hazard areas based on a study by the World Bank
2The inclusion of the state speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects is based on a statistical test. The Wald
Chi
2 tests in table 2 and 3 reject the null-hypothesis that all state speci￿c e￿ects are zero.
9and Columbia University (Dilley et al. 2005) that identi￿es global natu-
ral disaster hotspots. Data on ￿ood disasters from 1985 to 2003 has been
collected and georeferenced by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory. These
spatial historical data on ￿ood events have then been combined in 1◦×1◦
grid cells. The attributes of the grid cells range form 0 to 10, depending on
the amount of georeferenced ￿ood events in the grid cell. The GIS-data has
certain limitations: 1) Flood extent data identi￿es regions a￿ected by ￿oods
and not the exact ￿ooded areas. 2) Data on events in the early nineties are
missing or of low spatial quality. However, this GIS-data is the best (pub-
licly) available data on ￿ood hazard area at such an aggregated level that has
been collected and processed with a uniform method. We combined this data
with a spatial layer of U.S. county boundaries and calculated each county’s
mean ￿ood exposure. This GIS-data is used as a proxy for ‘objective’ ￿ood
risk and replaces the sum of ￿ood days in equation (2). Figure 2 shows that
the GIS-data was not collected U.S.-wide, thus we are able to perform a
robustness test for a reduced sample. Nevertheless, the proxy seems to be a
valid alternative as there is only weak correlation between the original and
the new risk variable (see table 2).
[Figure 2 about here]
After performing the robustness test with respect to the risk variable spa-
tial properties of our data is examined. The decision whether to participate
in the NFIP might not only depend on the form of government and certain
community characteristics, but also on the decisions of other, neighboring
municipalities. The rationale for this assumption is twofold: Individual de-
cisions are a￿ected by decisions of other individuals within their reference
group (Rincke 2006). As gathering information and evaluating alternatives
creates transaction costs it might be cheaper for individuals to observe deci-
sions made by other individuals and learn from the related outcomes. This
idea does also apply to decision makers within the political process. Besley
& Case (1995) show that o￿ce-motivated governments make policy deci-
sions in accordance to a certain reference system consisting of benchmark
jurisdictions.
A number of recent empirical studies have focused on the relationship
between the spatial dependencies and the di￿usion of policy innovations.
The empirical study by Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) on strategic interac-
10tion between U.S. states in pollution abatement laws shows that states are
responsive to abatement cost changes in neighboring states, at least when
neighboring states have ex ante more stringent pollution laws.
The second rationale is based on the theory of externalities that ap-
plies to the policy issue at hand; ￿ood hazard management. A community’s
decision to participate in the NFIP and the related adoption of ￿oodplain
management ordinances might induce external, transboundary costs and/or
bene￿ts on both up- and downstream communities. For example assume
the community A decides to build a levee-system as a result of the NFIP-
criteria. In case of continuing precipitation that amount of water that runs
downstream increases and could cause a ￿ood in downstream community B.
The work by Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) on pollution abatement laws
already shows that physical externalities create incentives for U.S. states to
take their neighboring states’ policy choices into account.
yi = γ0 + ρi
N X
j=1
Wdyj + γ1GovFormi + γ2Xi + γ3
N X
c=1
Floodsc + ui (3)
ui = λWdui + φi (4)
yj is the participation choice of municipality’s i neighbors weighted by
distance based matrix Wd. A signi￿cant and positive ρ would indicate that
the participation decisions are positively interdependent. The distance based
weight matrix is calculated using the coordinates (latitude and longitude) of
municipality’s geographical center. Based on a formula3 applied by Mutl
(2006) the distance from one municipality to all other municipalities can be
calculated. The resulting distance vectors are then used to determine the
individual weights, wij, in matrix Wd:
wij = log(dmax) − log(dij), (5)
where dmax is the maximum distance in our sample and dij denotes for
the distance between municipalities i and j. The result is a 5,008×5,008
distance weight matrix. We perform our spatial analysis in two steps. First
3dij = πrarccos[sin ωi sin ωj + cos ωi cos ωj cos(ψj − ψi)], where r = 6,731, the Earth’s
mean radius, ω = π
LAT
180 and ψ = π
LONG
180 are the latitude coordinate and the longitude
coordinate, respectively, in degrees radius.
11we estimate a probit with spatial correlation in the latent variable in order
to estimate whether there is an interdependency of participation decisions
among municipalities. In the second step we control for spatial correlation
in the error term.
3.3 Econometric results
Results of OLS-estimates demonstrate that municipalities with a city man-
ager feature a small (1.4%), but signi￿cantly higher level of mean family
income (see table 3). The IV-estimates present similar results with no ma-
jor changes in the size of the control variables. Our speci￿cation passes the
Hansen J test and has a good ￿rst stage R2. The results in table 3 sup-
port our model’s assumption that appointed o￿cials include performance
measures such as income in their policy strategies.
In the next step we turn our focus on the key question of this paper.
The results of the baseline estimates are presented in table 4. Column 4.1
shows the estimated coe￿cients and the respective marginal e￿ects of the
estimation without including the form of government. Mean family income,
population, the number of ￿ood days, the housing density and the number
of rental units have a positive e￿ect on the probability of participating in
the NFIP. The budget result has a negative impact as well as the percentage
of commuters. Alternative measures for ￿ood exposure, such as the sum of
￿ood damages before 1987, the mean ￿ood damage per year or the num-
ber of victims before 1987 lead to similar results. Racial fragmentation or
average level of eduction within the community do not have any signi￿cant
e￿ects. The percentage of correctly predicted participants is around 11.3.
Unemployment rate and the percentage of poor persons within the commu-
nity have been considered as additional control variables, however, they have
been excluded from the estimation due to their high correlation with mean
family income.
[Table 4 about here]
In the next step we included a dummy for the form of government, that
switches to 1 if the community is headed by a council manager and 0 if
the chief executive is an elected mayor. Municipalities headed by a coun-
cil manager have a 7.2% higher probability of participating in the NFIP in
comparison to communities headed by a mayor (column 4.2). These results
12accord to our hypothesis. The signi￿cance, sign and size of the other explana-
tory variables do not essentially change. A look at the correlation matrix
(see table 2) shows that, in contrast to assumptions made by Kreft (2007),
a council manager does not per se lead to higher levels of e￿ciency, at least
measured by indicators such as budget results or mean family income.
[Table 5 about here]
Due to potenial biases using the sum of ￿ood days as a proxy for the
municipality’s ￿ood risk we perform a robustness test using an alternative
￿ood proxy based on GIS-data. As the data is not avillable for the whole
sample the number of observations is reduced to 3,738. The signs of the
coe￿cients do not change and the size of the coe￿cients is similar to the
results in Table 4.
[Table 6 about here]
Columns 6.1 and 6.3 in table 6 represent the estimation results of the
￿rst-order spatial AR model, where we control for the adoption decisions of
all other communities weighted by their distance to community i, ρ. The
spatial lag term is signi￿cantly positive indicating a positive relationship of
participation decisions. If a given municipality chooses to participate in the
NFIP, this would positively a￿ect the decision of the neighboring commu-
nities and increases the probability of participation. Communities headed
by council managers still have a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on participation
choice (column 6.3) however the coe￿cient is smaller than in the probit esti-
mates. In the next step we estimated a general spatial model where we also
controlled for spatial autocorrelation in the errors (columns 6.2 and 6.4). In
comparison to the probit estimates, both the percentage correctly predicted
as well as the log-likelihood values improve.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper argues that elected and appointed executives follow di￿erent in-
centive schemes and as a result make di￿erent choices regarding risk-transfer
mechanisms against LPHL-events. The empirical results con￿rm the hy-
pothesis that appointed city managers have greater incentives to invest in
risk-transfer mechanisms i.e. participate in the NFIP. Our results are robust
13to the inclusion of an alternative ￿ood variable. The spatial estimates fur-
ther indicate that participation decision of one community is related to the
decisions of neighboring communities.
These empirical results could also have implications for propositions
made by theoretical models on the delegation of policy tasks to politicians
or bureaucrats. The model by Alesina & Tabellini (2007b) suggests that
under the assumption of uncertain voter preferences delegation of tasks to
politicians is preferable as the politician always chooses that policy that suits
voters’ preferences best. Given that our study provides a positive analysis
we cannot per se make any comment on that normative result. However, a
tentative point for further discussions can be brought forward.
First, decisions on risk-transfer-mechanisms against natural disasters seem
to be a￿ected by various problems indicating that at the constitutional table
(behind the veil of ignorance) individuals are ex-ante uncertain about their
ex-post preferences over di￿erent policies. Second, in principle this paper
provides a positive analysis does not evaluate the NFIP itself in terms of ef-
￿ciency. However, both theoretical and empirical literature already suggests
that the participation in the NFIP has positive e￿ects. Kunreuther & Pauly
(2006) proposes that, in general, ex-ante policies against natural hazards are
preferable to ex-post political decisions. The empirical study by Raschky
(2007) shows that the adverse e￿ects of an average ￿ood on personal income
are smaller in counties that have adopted the NFIP in comparison to other
counties. Luechinger & Raschky (2007) ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative e￿ect
of ￿ood events on individual life satisfaction in U.S. counties that do not
participate in the NFIP.
Under the assumption that the participation in the NFIP results in an
increase in e￿ciency (at least at the municipal level) the propositions made
by Alesina & Tabellini (2007b) might not hold within the context of LPHL-
events where individual preferences may be uncertain and subject to biases
and heuristics (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1982, Kunreuther & Pauly 2004). Pol-
icy choices made by re-elected agents in accordance to short-sighted voters’
preferences could increase existing ine￿ciencies and cause negative exter-
nalities on federal level (e.g. Samarita’s dilemma and governmental relief).
This proposition demands a more in-depth analysis and empirical evidence
controlling for the expected costs of the participation as well as the expected
bene￿ts.
14A Theoretical model
The general framework is set by the model on bureaucrats, politicians and
multiple policy tasks (Alesina & Tabellini 2007b). However, the bureau-
cratic agent in our case is not just - as in the traditional sense - an executing
agency restricted to implementing public policies (e.g. Niskanen 1971, MiguØ
& BØlanger 1974) but an appointed public o￿cial with managerial respon-
sibility. We implement the general assumptions Maskin & Tirole (2004)
and Rauch (1995) in the existing framework. Enikopolov (2007) has already
developed a model to compare policy decisions on communal public employ-
ment between elected and appointed executives.
To illustrate why appointed executives are more likely to participate in
the NFIP we ￿rst specify voter’s utility function that depends two public
policies and the state of nature. Then describe the incentives of both elected
and appointed agents and their maximization strategies are compared.
Voters in a community derive utility, U, from both a publicly provided
good G and expected income y in the two states of nature.
Ut = (1 − π)[y − τ + G(a) − P(b)] + π [y(b) + τ + G(a) − P(b)] (6)
A state of nature with a natural disaster can occur with a probability,
π, where 0 > π > 1. In the disaster state, income y is destroyed and
maybe replaced. However the replacement depends on the level of insurance
coverage b. Insurance is costly and these costs are de￿ned by function P(b).
Both activities, the provision of a public good and risk-transfer are ￿nanced
by a lump-sum tax τ, is assumed to be exogenously determined and amounts
to
τ = a + b. (7)
A.1 Politicians:
Politicians’ decisions are driven by re-election concerns. Rational voters
compare the ability of the incumbents with the expected ability of the op-
ponents. Based on the assumptions of public choice theory and binding
re-election constraints, incumbents care about the utility of the voters, U.
15The voters’ decision depends on the incumbents’ expected future ability ηt+1
conditional on their current performance. They will vote for the incumbent
if
E(ηt+1|xt) ≥ 0. (8)
Assuming that the incumbents’ ability is inferred by the voters’ observa-
tions of their current performance and the politicians’ performance measures
is what voter’s care about than the politicians utility function can be written
as:
V P(a,b) = Ut (9)
A.2 Bureaucrats
Bureaucrats in the form of city managers are driven by career concerns and
his future market value. They care about how future employees (e.g. other
municipalities) perceive their ability, θ. The bureaucrats utility function can
be written as
V B = (θ|zt) (10)
where θ are the expectations on the bureaucrats ability conditional on
the realization of the performance measurement zt. Beside the utility of
the voters, U, the measure of performance could include more ‘comparable
indicators’ such as the community’s overall income or a budget surplus. For
reasons of simplicity we take income, y, as this other performance measure.
If the constitution assigns responsibility for a policy task to the bureaucrat,
it also de￿nes the relevant performance measures and assigns the parameter
φ to weigh the importance of the inhabitants’ utility within the performance
measure. The bureaucrats utility can be rewritten as:
V B(Ut,yt) = (φUt + (1 − φ)yt) (11)
The φ accounts for the arguments put forward by Maskin & Tirole (2004).
A low phi suggests that the in￿uence of voters’ preferences on the appointed
o￿cial’s performance and thus the accountability is not high. In the next
step we consider the delegation of the task to either form of government. We
16start with the bureaucrat an set up the Lagrangian by using equations (6),
(7) and (11):
LB(a,b) = φ[(1 − π)(y − τ + G(a) − P(b)) + π(y(b) − τ + G(a) − p(b)]
+ (1 − φ)((1 − π)y + πy(b)) + λ(τ − (a + b))
(12)
The ￿rst order condition is:
(1 − φ)y0(b) + (−P0(b)(1 − π) + π(y0(b) − P0(b))φ − λ
= ((1 − π)G0(a) + πG0(a))φ − λ
(13)
Using equations , and building the Lagrangian we receive the ￿rst order
condition for the politician:
(1 − π)(−P0(b)) + π(y0(b) − P0(b)) − λ
= ((1 − π)G0(a) + πG0(a)) − λ
(14)
We can see that
∂P0(b)
∂y > 0 and
∂P0(b)
∂π > 0 for both, appointed and elected
o￿cials, however, P0B(b) > P0P(b). This means that the amount of public
money spend on insurance b increases with the probability of occurrence and
the income at risk and is higher for the appointed o￿cial.
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21Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Part. NFIP 5,016 0.650 0.477 0 1
Mayor 5,016 0.753 0.431 0 1
City Manager 5,016 0.243 0.429 0 1
Mean Family Income 5,016 35,949.90 16,529.84 11,105 269,450
Unemployment rate 5,016 0.069 0.036 0 0.310
Persons poor 5,016 0.159 0.097 0.000 0.680
Employed within county 5,016 0.752 0.170 0.110 1.000
Vacant houses 5,016 0.088 0.068 0.000 0.900
Vacant rental units 5,016 0.090 0.064 0.000 0.820
Rental units 5,016 0.330 0.111 0.010 0.910
Budget surplus 5,016 -237.600 16,833 -256,490 593,301
Population 5,016 12,023 59,379 1001 3,009,528
No. of ￿ood days 5,016 22 17 0 112
in county































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 3: Impact of government form on mean household income.
Dependent Variable: OLS IV
Ln(Mean family Coe￿cient Coe￿cient
income) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Mayor Reference group




Higher Education 0.019*** 0.019***
(in %) (0.001) (0.001)
Adult unemployment −0.023*** −0.023***
rate (in %) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed within −0.002*** −0.002***
county (in %) (0.000) (0.000)






R2/Centr. R2 0.716 0.710
Prob>F 0.000 0.000
Number of obs. 5,016 5,016
No. of instruments 3
F-test of excl. inst 0.000
Shea’s partial R2 0.516
Hansen J stat. 0.155
Anderson LR stat. 0.000
Notes: ***, **, * indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
24Table 4: Participating at the NFIP 1987 (Probit-estimates).
Dependent Variable: 4.1 4.2
Municipality participates Coe￿cient M.E. Coe￿cient M.E.
in NFIP (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Mayor Reference group
City Manager 0.208*** 0.072***
(0.060) (0.021)
ln(Mean Family Income) 0.572*** 0.204*** 0.526*** 0.188***
(0.099) (0.036) (0.096) (0.035)
Budget −0.012** −0.004** −0.012** −0.004**
(in Mio. USD) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Population 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.005***
(in 1,000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
No.of ￿ood days 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Housing density 0.882*** 0.315*** 0.855** 0.306***
(0.174) (0.063) (0.172) (0.062)
Employed within 0.003** 0.001** 0.002* 0.001*
county (in %) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Vacant houses (in%) −0.004 −0.002 −0.005 −0.002
(0.004) (0.002)) (0.004) (0.002)
Vacant rental 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002
units (in %) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Rental units (in %) 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
State dummies Yes Yes
Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000
Number of obs. 5,008 5,008
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000
Log-(Pseudo)likelihood -2,878.231 -2,871.246
Percentage correctly predicted 68.71 69.05
Notes: ***, **, * indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.







26Table 5: Participating at the NFIP 1987 - Robustness Test.
Dependent Variable: 5.1 5.2
Municipality participates Coe￿cient M.E. Coe￿cient M.E.
in NFIP (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Mayor Reference group
City Manager 0.274*** 0.095***
(0.070) (0.023)
ln(Mean Family Income) 0.637*** 0.229*** 0.580*** 0.209***
(0.114) (0.042) (0.110) (0.040)
Budget −0.011* −0.004* −0.009* −0.003*
(in Mio. USD) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Population 0.014** 0.005** 0.019** 0.005**
(in 1,000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Flood exposure 0.019** 0.007** 0.019** 0.007**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Housing density 0.981*** 0.353*** 0.941*** 0.339***
(0.202) (0.074) (0.199) (0.073)
Employed within 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
county (in %) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vacant houses (in%) −0.012 −0.004 −0.011 −0.004
(0.008) (0.002)) (0.007) (0.003)
Vacant rental 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002
units (in %) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Rental units (in %) 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
State dummies Yes Yes
Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000
Number of obs. 3,738 3,738
Log-(Pseudo)likelihood -2,157.683 -2,148.941
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000
Percentage correctly predicted 90.26 90.93
Notes: ***, **, * indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
27Table 6: Participating at the NFIP 1987 (Spatial-estimates).
Dependent Variable: 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
Municipality participates Coe￿. Coe￿. Coe￿. Coe￿.
in NFIP (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
ρa 0.190*** 0.149*** 0.193*** 0.148***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Mayor Ref. group
City Manager 0.090*** 0.092***
(0.017) (0.017)
ln(Mean Family Income) 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.176*** 0.175***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.019)
Budget −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(in Mio. USD) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(in 1,000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No.of ￿ood days 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Housing density 0.253*** 0.248*** 0.236*** 0.231**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Employed within 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
county (in %) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vacant houses (in%) −0.002 −0.003* −0.005* −0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vacant rental 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002
units (in %) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Rental units (in %) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of obs. 5,008 5,008 5,008 5,008
Log-(Pseudo)likelihood -1,308.917 1,566.051 -1,295.455 1,579.934
λb 0.746*** 0.788***
(0.088) (0.111)
Notes: ***, **, * indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. a Spatial lag term; b Spatial
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Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks 
 
Abstract 
The paper compares the policy choices regarding risk-transfer against low-
probability-high-loss events between elected and appointed public officials. Empirical 
evidence using data on U.S. municipality-level shows that appointed city managers 
are more likely to adopt federal risk-transfer regimes. It is argued that the variation in 
the level of insurance activity emerges from the different incentive schemes each 
government form is facing. Controlling for spatial dependencies further shows that 
the participation decision in the insurance program significantly depends on the 
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